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The paper examines the impact of recent inflation and financial shocks on the 
vulnerable, and explores policy design to reduce both future shocks and vulnerability 
to shocks. Inflation affects the typical savings cum pension portfolio and the specific 
consumption basket of the old, as prices of services rise compared to manufactured 
goods. Money illusion and habit, which tend to increase with age, aggravate the 
psychological trauma associated with inflation. The decline of traditional sources of 
social security marginalizes those without savings, in the context of sustained rural-
urban and international migration. Trends determining inflation—domestic and 
global, institutional change, and greater openness explain why inflation has been 
moderate in India, compared to other emerging markets. Since the polity is averse to 
high inflation, and commodity price shocks are moderating, high inflation will not 
persist. But the shocks demonstrate the importance of food price inflation for 
aggregate inflation in populous South Asia. Therefore improvements in agricultural 
productivity, with supportive buffer stock, fiscal and monetary policy are critical to 
lower the level of chronic inflation. Regulatory changes to reduce excessive risk-
taking in financial markets and the aggravation of inflation from speculation are 
examined. Finally, other policy measures to improve security for the old and keep 
them an active, vital part of the community are drawn together. 
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Insecurities of the old and marginalized: Inflation, Oil 






The recent period has seen multiple shocks especially to the economically vulnerable. 
While sharp inflation in essential commodities reduced consumption, inflation eroded 
the value of savings in fixed income securities, and the collapse of financial markets 
wiped out equity based savings. The paper argues policy must put the vulnerable at 
center-stage and explores policy design to reduce both future shocks and vulnerability 
to shocks. 
 
The first section establishes the impact of inflation on the typical savings cum pension 
portfolio and on the specific consumption basket of the old, as prices of services rise 
compared to manufactured goods. It analyzes (i) the role of money illusion and habit, 
which tend to increase with age, on the psychological trauma associated with 
inflation, and (ii) the impact of the decline of traditional sources of social security, for 
the marginalized without savings, in the context of sustained rural-urban and 
international migration. 
 
The next section turns to the macroeconomic trends determining inflation, giving 
reasons inflation has been moderate in India, compared to other emerging markets, 
examining the impact of global trends, institutional change, and greater openness. 
India typically has had high single digit rates of inflation. These had halved in the past 
few years. Policy aimed to keep inflation at around 5 percent, gradually bringing it 
down to 3 percent. Productivity improvements and lower global food prices had 
contributed to containing inflation. But global oil and food price shocks, aggravated 
by commodity speculation, led to a resurgence of inflation worldwide in 2008. Since 
the polity is averse to high inflation, it cannot persist in India. The reversal of 
commodity price shocks and the global slowdown brought inflation down in 2009, 
although food price inflation remained persistent. The shocks demonstrate the 
importance of food price inflation for aggregate Indian inflation. South Asia shares   4
this feature because of shared high population density. We discuss improvements in 
agricultural productivity, with supportive buffer stock, fiscal and monetary policy that 
can lower the level of chronic inflation.  
 
Given the impact of financial crises on savings of the old and on liabilities of 
domestic taxpayers, and aggravation of inflation from speculation in commodity 
future markets, the next section, examines regulatory changes to moderate excessive 
volatility in financial markets and consequent transfer of resources from the 
vulnerable.    
 
Apart from inflation control through productivity improvements and improvements in 
financial regulation, the next section draws out other implications for policy, ranging 
from pension reform, specific social security measures, special schemes for medical 
services through public-private partnership, better organization as a vote group, 
disability access and the provision of other facilities that can keep the old an active, 
vital part of the community. 
 
Fixed Incomes and Inflation 
Inflation is not a problem for those whose wages or salaries also inflate. But if your 
income is Rupees 10,000 from a fixed pension, and inflation is running at ten percent 
per annum your real income shrinks every year. In fourteen years time you are left 
with nothing in real terms. There are two categories of people whose incomes are not 
or are only partially inflation indexed. The first are the old on pensions fixed in 
nominal terms and the second are workers in the informal sector without a regular 
process for revision of wages. Even if nominal pensions and wages are revised, this 
happens in an arbitrary way and after years of steady erosion.  
 
Older people do not rely only on pensions. Normally they have assets and income 
from assets. But given habit, lack of choice in developing countries that reinforces 
this habit, the natural preference for security and the high risk-aversion of the aged, 
they largely opt for fixed deposits or government bonds if available. These assets tend 
to have low interest rates that barely keep up with inflation, so that if they withdraw   5
income earned, their assets shrink in real value
2. For example, if they are living on a 
ten percent income stream that equals the rate of inflation, they are effectively eating 
away their assets at ten percent. If they are not spending the asset income, adding it to 
the asset instead, the asset is maintained, but they get zero income from it. Therefore 
inflation steadily eats away the typical savings cum pension portfolio. At ten percent 
inflation, an asset halves in value every seven years. 
 
The problem is worse for the old, first because of changes in relative prices that 
accompany an inflationary development process. The consumption basket of the old is 
heavily weighted towards informal services whose prices rise compared to 
manufactured goods. If laptops are becoming cheaper this does not help the old who 
may not be using them. Since their consumption basket may be more static they are 
left out of lifestyle innovation that has the potential to lower costs. Medical expenses, 
however, rise steeply. There is the problem of higher prices for better quality. New 
medicines or technologies of treatment may be lifesaving but are difficult to fit in a 
budget set when these treatments did not exist. A major illness or prolonged 
hospitalization can be impossible to finance without insurance or government help. 
 
Second, inflation creates a psychological trauma because of money illusion and habit, 
which tend to increase with age. The frequency of complaints at escalated prices for 
everyday goods rises with age, even if the escalation of incomes keeps up or is higher. 
Money illusion makes the nominal price matter. If incomes have not kept up, of 
course, there are genuine grounds for complaint. The economists’ prescription of 
adjusting demand in response to changes in relative prices is more difficult for the old 
who are set in their ways and unwilling to consume less of items they are used to, but 
whose prices have increased. Psychology has been enriching economics in recent 
times. We have learnt why it may be rational to be irrational and that people are 
irrational in predictable ways. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) tells us 
that a loss is felt more severely compared to a gain. The aged face many losses, of 
health, of agility, of associates. Inflation adds to these losses.  
 
                                                 
2 These choices are reinforced since public sector banks give higher interest rates to senior citizens on fixed 
deposits. This is an example of a government policy to allow the aged a better income, given their 
preferences.     6
So far we have been discussing the effect of inflation on those who have income or 
assets. But what of the marginalized who have no savings, or pensions? The family 
was the great insurance against poverty, old age and ill health. But families are 
breaking up with higher mobility and a smaller cohort size. There is migration from 
rural to urban areas and from cities and villages to foreign locales. The Indian 
government had washed its hands of social security, leaving it to the private sector. It 
is seeking to arrest the inevitable decline in traditional sources of this security by 
passing laws making children liable for the welfare of old parents. But the problem 
also arises since old are not willing or find it difficult to change residence/ lifestyle to 
adapt to the very different lives of their children. There may be real time and distance 
constraints for the younger generation. This is a problem also for those with means, 
not just for the marginalized. Therefore social or institutional alternatives have to be 
developed.  
 
Trends in Inflation 
We have seen that inflation has very negative effects on the aged. But what are 
expected inflationary trends given liberalizing market reforms? These have coincided 
with much lower inflation worldwide, except over 2007-08. Are there factors making 
for lower trend inflation in the world and in India?  
 
Indian inflation has been moderate, compared to other emerging markets, such as 
some Latin American countries where inflation routinely exceeded triple digits. India 
typically has had high single digit rates of inflation. These had halved in the past few 
years. Policy was hoping to keep inflation at around 5 percent, gradually bringing it 
down to 3 percent. Productivity improvements and lower global commodity and food 
price inflation had contributed to importing low inflation. Monetary policy had also 
improved, with Central Banks able to credibly anchor inflation expectations.    
 
The seventies oil shock had triggered a worldwide bout of high inflation, but 
subsequent shocks were absorbed without inflation until 2007. Equivalent crude price 
shocks occurred in the late seventies, late nineties and over 2002-2005 but the world, 
including India, bore these better. The reasons according to Blanchard and Gali 
(2007) were openness, cheap imports, more flexible wages, less dependence on oil,   7
and better monetary policy. There was also the absence of other adverse shocks. 
Rising productivity lowered costs even in the emerging markets.  
 
But the steep spike in food and oil prices together over 2007-08 has again sparked 
worldwide inflation even as the world was struggling with the fallout of the sub-prime 
crisis. International food and commodity prices had been largely falling through the 
nineties but reversed in 2002 (Table 2). The rise has been particularly steep for food 
prices in 2006-07 (12.5 percent) and 2007-08 (45.28 percent)
3. Explanations for the 
rise in food prices, include stagnating agricultural productivity and investment after a 
decade of falling prices, the use of grain for biofuels
4, climate change and drought in 
parts of the world, input costs rising with oil prices, increasing consumption including 
that of meat in fast-growing emerging economies with a relative neglect of 
agriculture, and the weak US dollar.   
 
Crude price rose sharply: more than 100 percent over 2002-05, and another 100 
percent since then. It peaked at $147 per barrel on July 11, 2008
5, but in another two 
months had fallen again to $100, and crashed to below $40 by the end of the year. 
Demand was close to supply for oil, inventories were low, and despite the slowdown 
in the US, robust oil demand was expected from emerging markets, while the OPEC 
cartel curtailed supply. Speculation in future markets influenced spot prices. But after 
the Saudis began pumping more oil, and there were signs of consumer resistance to 
high prices, the tide turned. Many hedge funds lost money as prices crashed. 
 
Since shortages coincided with a real slowdown and financial turmoil, the large 
liquidity pumped in to prevent a downturn went into commodity speculation and 
aggravated price spikes. But as the demand slowdown reduced commodity demand, 
prices fell equally steeply. Although short-run commodity supply is fixed and demand 
is inelastic, high prices for any specific commodity do lead to a rise in supply and 
decrease in demand over time. The concentrated, coincident and exceptionally large 
spikes in commodity prices could not be absorbed without inflation. Since the spikes 
                                                 
3 The monthly average price for benchmark Thai white rice shot up to $US962.60 a tonne in May 2008 from 
$US385 in January. Food riots occurred in many places in the world. 
4 The IMF estimated that biofuels accounted for almost half the increase in consumption of major food crops 
in 2006-2007.  
5 The rise had been very rapid. For example, on 20 November 2007 it had been at $ 90. The average price in 
2007 was $ 67.93 per barrel.   8
have moderated, however, so should inflation. But the experience of coordinated 
spikes suggests that it is necessary to protect those vulnerable to such spikes, and to 
prevent their recurrence. It will help them most if this is done with minimum loss in 
output. A growing economy has more resources to spend on the old and vulnerable. 
 
Prospects for Indian Inflation 
Inflation and especially inflation in food prices is a very politically sensitive issue in 
India given the large voting population at subsistence, without automatic indexation 
of incomes to inflation. The old are also part of the latter group. Indian policy 
therefore has always responded strongly to inflation spikes but the political economy 
of interventions and farm price support has encouraged high costs and persistent low-
level inflation. High food prices raise wages over the longer term and affect costs in 
all sectors. Stagflation sets in after an initial supply (oil price) shock if wages rise 
forcing a further price rise. The weight of food is 46.2 percent in the CPI-IW, 15.4 
percent in the WPI. Petrol and diesel have a lower weight—only 5 percent weight in 
the WPI. Rise in wages in response to food prices have been important in second 
round propagation of Indian inflation. South Asia shares these features because of a 
shared high population density, although differing political structures can make 
governments less sensitive to public opinion.  
 
Indian policy response to past oil shocks demonstrates the concentrated action against 
inflation spurts
6. Table 1 gives growth, inflation, and policy variables starting from 
one year before and continuing for one year after the first three episodes when there 
was sharp inflation in the fuel component of the WPI (FPL&L). It also shows the 
importance of food price inflation for aggregate Indian inflation. Each period saw 
about a 100 percent rise in international oil prices, but the pass through to Indian 
prices was a policy decision. Monetary and fiscal tools were also used. The Table 
shows rates of growth of reserve money, broader M3, and ratio of Central 




                                                 
6 This part draws on analysis in Goyal (2008).   9




























1972-73 -0.3  12.1  18.3  14.6  10  9.7  4  -0.6 
1973-74 4.6  20.6  17.4 12.5  20.2  28.1  18.6  15.9 
1974-75 1.2  4.6  10.9 12.8  25.2  25.2  25.2  118.6 
1975-76 9  2.7  15 14.9  -1.1  -6.6  10.5  14.4 
1976-77 1.2  25.5  23.6 15.2  2.1  0.8  5.3  4.9 
                 
2 
1978-79 5.5  28.7  21.9 17.0  0  -1.3  4.4  4.2 
1979-80 -5.2  17.7  17.7  15.7  7.1  13.8  15.7  42.2 
1980-81 7.2  17.4  18.1 15.8  18.2  15  25.2  58.4 
1981-82 5.6  7.9  12.5 15.0  9.3  11.3  20.7  25.5 
1982-83 2.9  10.1  16.6 16.4  4.9  6.7  6.5  -9.6 
                 
3 
1998-99 6.7  14.5  19.4 16.0  3.3  12.1  3.3  -34.2 
1999-00 6.4  8.2  14.6 15.3  3.3  1.2  9.1  39.9 
2000-01 4.4  8.1  16.8 15.5  7.2  2.8  28.5  61.4 
2001-02 5.8  11.4  14.1 15.9  3.6  3.6  8.9  -18.8 
2002-03 3.8  9.2  14.7 16.8  3.4  3.3  5.5  5.0 
Source: RBI Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy; for crude oil: www.eia.doe.gov. 
Reproduced from Goyal (2008).  
 
 
Shock 1 saw a drastic cut in reserve money growth, and some cut in government 
expenditure. Inflation was negative by the third year, but growth lost was high. In 
shock 2 the contraction was milder and was moderated also by the smaller effect the 
contraction in reserve money now had on broad money. Inflation showed neither the 
peaks nor the troughs of the earlier episode and took a bit longer to moderate. The 
growth loss was concentrated in the first year, driven by a fall in agricultural output. 
Deficits expanded with subsidies. Shock 3 had a similar fiscal tightening and an even 
milder monetary squeeze. M3 growth was quite stable. Yet inflation moderated 
quickly; output growth was respectable. Deficits improved. Apart from milder 
monetary contractions, a key difference accounting for improved outcomes was lower 
agricultural inflation compared to the earlier two episodes. Despite stagnating 
domestic agriculture, falling international prices in a more open regime had countered 
political pressures, from the strong farm lobby, to ratchet up procurement prices.  
 
 
Table 2 shows how lower inflation in primary articles from 1999-2000, following the 
fall in the world food inflation, contributed to lower Indian inflation, despite oil 
shocks. Consumer price inflation also fell. During the fourth oil shock over 2007-08,   10




Table 2: Comparing Indian and Foreign Commodity Inflation 
 
Inflation from Indian Wholesale Price Index 
Inflation as per IMF 
Commodity Price Index 
(Point to Point Basis 
(March-March)) 




























1990-91  10.3 13  12.3  8.4  11.6       
1991-92  13.7 18.1  13.2  11.3  13.5       
1992-93  10.1 7.5  14.1  10.9  9.6       
1993-94  8.4 6.9  15.5  7.8  7.5       
1994-95  12.6 15.8  8.9  12.3  10.1       
1995-96  8 8.2  5.1  8.5 10.2       
1996-97  4.6 8.4  10.4  2.1  9.4       
1997-98  4.4 2.7  13.8  2.9  6.8       
1998-99  5.9 12.1  3.3  4.4  13.1  4.39  -12.82  27.41 
1999-00  3.3 1.2  9.1  2.7  3.4  25.03  2.4  49.51 
2000-01  7.2 2.8  28.5  3.3  3.8  -3.3  -2.8  -2.9 
2001-02  3.6 3.6  8.9  1.8  4.3  -7.4  -2.7  -9.9 
2002-03  3.4 3.3  5.5  2.6  4 17.72  10.18  27.59 
2003-04  5.5 4.3  6.4  5.7  3.9  16.52  23.91  12.64 
2004-05  6.5 3.6  10.1  6.3  3.8  27.13  -4.0  46.38 
2005-06  4.4  2.9  9.5  3.1  4.4  16.20 2.32 19.96 
2006-07  5.4 7.8  5.6  4.4  6.7  8.15  12.51  0.28 





12.5 11.5  17.6  10.9  8.3       
Source: Calculated from www.rbi.org.in and 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/datar 
 
Because of policy intervention, Indian inflation responds only with a lag to world 
price inflation. Although world food prices had started rising in 2002, following rising 
oil prices, Indian food inflation remained low, partly since the pass through of oil 
prices was moderated, and partly since minimum support prices for the major cereals 
increased only marginally in this period. But after mild increases (prices were almost   11
stationary) from 1999, Indian procurement prices also jumped up in 2006-07, and 
inflation in primary articles reached 7.8 percent. Table 3 shows the rapid rise in 
procurement prices from 2006-07. With the discipline on procurement prices from 
low border prices gone, and food stocks at an all time low
7, the government was 
forced to offer special bonuses—support and procurement prices rose sharply
8.      
 
Table 3: Food price inflation and minimum support prices 
 
Year 2006-07  2007-08  2008-09 
(February09) 
WPI Food Articles  7.68 5.27 9.93 
WPI Foodgrains  
(Cereals + Pulses)  10.17 3.94 12.12 
Minimum support prices 
Paddy  610+ 675^^  - 
Wheat  650# 750^ 1080 
# An incentive bonus of Rs. 50 per quintal given on wheat   purchased during 20.3.06 to 
30.6.06 over and above the MSP. 
+ An incentive bonus of Rs. 40 per quintal over and above MSP given on paddy applicable 
for the period 1
st October 2006 to 31
st March, 2007. Applicability of incentive bonus for 
States of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal has been 
extended upto 30.9.2007.  For Bihar and Kerala the same has been allowed upto 31.5.2007. 
^ An incentive bonus of Rs. 100 per quintal over and above the MSP for wheat in RMS 2007-
08 has been allowed.   
^^ An incentive bonus of Rs 100/- over and above MSP for paddy in KMS 2007-08 allowed. 




The rise was, however, much below the spike in international food prices. Since food 
stocks have been built up and the domestic supply response was there, it was possible 
to prevent an Indian spike.  
 
Indian policy follows a tightrope between the interests of the farmer and that of the 
consumer. Consumer interest dominates under sharp spikes because of the political 
sensitivity to inflation. Spikes are always resisted. Since the supply response to 
commodity and food prices takes some time, prices can rise steeply under temporary 
supply shortfalls. That is why buffer stock and administered prices; changes in taxes, 
tariffs and subsidies to smooth prices are useful for consumers. They are useful for 
                                                 
7Foodgrain stocks, which had been a healthy 482.05 lakh tonnes in 2003 fell steeply after that, and had 
reached a trough of 123.82 in October 2006 below the buffer stock norm (figures from fcamin.nic.in). 
Recovery of stocks required a rise in procurement prices and some restrictions on exports. 
8 In 2005-06 the paddy support price had been Rs 600 and wheat Rs 640.    12
producers also because sharp spikes can lead to a massive plantation that can 
subsequently cause prices to collapse. But these policies also prevent transmission of 
international price falls, and maintain chronic low inflation. Although WPI inflation 
had fallen to 5 percent in early 2009 CPI inflation, with a large weight of food, was 
running at about 10 percent.  
 
Table 2 shows not only is international inflation passed on with a lag, since a decision 
to change administered prices occurs with a lag, but a spike is always moderated. 
Indian prices, however, continue to rise even when international are falling, so that the 
rise is the same, or maybe even more, but staggered over a longer period. This is 
especially clear in the oil sector, even though with reform, the share of administered 
prices is shrinking. The oil pool account and administered price mechanism created in 
1974 was dismantled in 2002 but administered prices were retained for petrol, diesel, 
kerosene and gas. The UPA government did not fully pass on these shocks but unable 
to subsidize the sheer magnitude of rise, it finally raised prices in 2008. Since fuel 
prices neither rose nor fell as much as international, cumulative Indian fuel inflation 
had exceeded international until 2005; after that it was less.      
 
Optimal Policy Response 
Thus the Indian response to inflation includes first, fiscal policies working through 
administered prices, buffer stocks and tax/tariff mechanisms. Expanding food supply, 
and insulating domestic food prices, to the extent possible, from sharp international 
price spikes is useful. Second, although monetary policy is regarded as the most 
potent medicine for inflation, under a temporary supply shock its role should be 
restricted to anchoring inflationary wage-price expectations.  A moderate tightening, 
with a long-term inflation target, is sufficient for this purpose. Greater interest 
sensitivity now makes new options available. Gradual adjustment is possible as 
forward-looking agents factor in future steps. Policy must encourage the productivity 
improvements that can absorb a rise in nominal wages without raising prices; a sharp 
demand squeeze would hinder this process. If inflation is credibly expected to come 
down, a temporary spike will not set in motion the wage-price spiral. The first round 
inflation from a supply shock has to be accommodated, but second round effects 
prevented. Since prices tend to be rigid downward, the initial relative price adjustment 
should be allowed to go through.   13
 
Some exchange rate appreciation is another weapon available to monetary policy as a 
response to temporary external supply shocks. It lowers the impact of global 
commodity price rise. Large foreign exchange reserves make such a policy feasible. 
Appreciating the exchange rate can work for a temporary shock, but a persistent 
supply shock requires a rise in productivity to sustain appreciation without output 
loss. A competitive real exchange rate must be maintained to prevent rising current 
account deficits.  
 
In the Indian context, that exports did not suffer from appreciation implies some 
productivity improvements have taken place – so limited appreciation is possible. But 
the real exchange rate also has to be compatible with the level of real wages. Real 
appreciation allows real wages to rise. But if nominal wages rise, without a rise in 
productivity, inflation will force a real appreciation even without a nominal 
appreciation. So under a temporary shock nominal appreciation can abort this wage-
price cycle. If the shock is permanent, there is some output cost (as exports fall), 
unless productivity gains have reduced costs.  The steep depreciation of 2008 was not 
able to stimulate exports in the face of the global demand contraction, suggesting such 
a sharp depreciation was not required.  
 
Third, falling demand may reduce industry’s ability to pass on costs through price 
increases. But mark-ups tend to rise when volumes fall as industry tries to protect 
margins. Therefore productive growth is the best way for India to avoid the past 
stagflationary trap. This is particularly urgent given the pressures on international 
food prices. Improving supply chain efficiencies can give farmers better prices 
without raising prices for consumers. Historically terms of trade have improved in 
favour of farmers when agriculture price inflation was low.  But policy has to 
stimulate sustained improvements in agricultural productivity rather than a support 
price-subsidy complex that encourages high costs. The crude price rise may be a 
bubble that has burst, but action is required to contain creeping domestic food price 
inflation.  
   14
Inflation aversion of the polity ensures the vulnerable in India are protected from 
inflation price spikes but improvements in policy are required to deliver them from 
low chronic inflation that eats away their savings.  
 
Speculation and Inflation Volatility 
The unprecedented volatility in global oil and food prices implicates financial 
markets. To prevent recurrence of such episodes, reform of financial markets is also 
required.    
 
The US sub-prime mortgage crisis hit financial markets in August 2007 and spread to 
other countries. Massive liquidity was pumped in to keep markets going, but with a 
real sector slowdown funds started looking for returns from oil and food future 
markets, since demand is relatively inelastic for these products
9, supply was close to 
demand and takes time to adjust. The one-way movement in futures prices, since 
everyone expected prices to rise, pulled up spot prices. The speculative wave 
contributed but a rise in spot prices requires a rise in inventories. Although public 
inventories remained low there may have been large-scale private hoarding. 
Moreover, in oil markets, the OPEC cartel impacts supply.   
 
Thus there are two questions for financial regulation. First, how to prevent crises in 
the financial sector? Second, and more specific, the effect of commodity future 
markets on spot prices. 
 
Financial crisis 
The features that distorted incentives and encouraged excessive risk-taking are now 
well understood
10. Among these were procyclical bonuses, securitization, uniform 
mark to market accounting rules, conflicts of interest for rating agencies, and reliance 
on risk models based on market prices, so that systemic risk and diversity of views 
were neglected. Regulation was weakened both in law and in practice.  
 
                                                 
9 Jha (2008) quotes from the Commodities and Futures section of the International Business Times that the 
July futures price for rice rose 71 per cent between early December 2007 and the third week of April, and 
from the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation that since 2005 investors have begun to use agricultural 
markets either for speculation or for portfolio diversification.  Jha also reported in private correspondence on 
time series results that show future prices to influence spot, but not the other way around. 
10 These features are discussed in more detail in Goyal (2009), which this section is based on.    15
Greenspan and Rubin strongly rebuffed attempts to increase regulatory oversight over 
derivative markets and mortgage lenders, since they believed markets were self-
regulating, while regulators would damage innovation, and the ownership society, 
since their natural inclination was to prevent activity.  After the US Glass-Steagall Act 
that separated investment and commercial banks was repealed in 1999, commercial 
banks also were able to underwrite and trade asset backed securities etc. through off 
balance sheet structured investment vehicles. The US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) was now the regulatory authority for securities and brokerage 
operations of investment banks. To escape threatened regulation in the EU, 
investment banks sought a bargain in 2004 that gave the SEC voluntary regulatory 
oversight over the parent holding companies as well. In return, the SEC allowed 
higher leverage, relaxing the ceiling of twelve times capital on borrowing. Capital 
adequacy requirements, such as the Federal Reserve (Fed) imposed on deposit 
accepting banks, were now missing, but the window the SEC had been given on the 
banks risky investments was never used.  
The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 exempted credit default 
insurance from regulation by calling them swaps. The post Enron 2002 Sarbanes 
Oxley Act allowed off balance sheet activities so long as other entities held the risks 
and rewards, thus encouraging the “originate and distribute” model. Amendment to 
the Community Reinvestment Act in the mid-nineties allowed securitization of sub-
prime mortgages to make home loans possible for low-income categories, since the 
Clinton administration wanted to expand home ownership. A laudable objective was 
driven to excess in the Bush era where loans were pushed without documentation, to 
parties with no collateral except rising housing prices. Tax breaks such as deduction 
of mortgage interest payments from household taxable income further encouraged 
leverage. The boom psychology of greed and euphoria took hold. 
A consequence of light regulation was high leverage: 30:1 compared to 15:1 for a 
commercial bank. Investment banks made money by borrowing short in the wholesale 
retail market, leveraging the borrowing many times and lending long. This kind of 
strategy is extremely susceptible to a fall in asset values and is not viable if stricter 
regulatory norms reduce leverage. This is one reason the remaining investment banks   16
have been forced to become bank holding companies, which have now been put under 
the Fed’s regulation. 
Without any central netting or regulatory knowledge, the chain of securities and 
structures financing sub prime mortgages was opaque. This meant investors could not 
determine the location and extent of risk when housing prices began to fall. When the 
ABX index introduced showed a rapid fall in the price of sub prime bonds, the lack of 
knowledge of where the risk lay led to worry about counterparties, a freeze in intra-
bank markets, and spreading crashes in the prices of structured products as banks 
were forced to sell them. The fear driven collapse had begun before, but was 
intensified after Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail.  
 
The contribution of low interest rates to the liquidity build up was tiny compared to 
that due to lax regulation. BIS estimates that notional amounts outstanding in 
derivatives grew from $100 trillion in 2002 to $516 in April 2007—an annual 
compound rate of growth of 33 percent. Compared to this, the broadest measure of US 
money supply is about $15 trillion with an annual growth rate of about 6 percent.  
Monetary policy’s first priority must be the real sector and cycle, since counter 
cyclical prudential regulation is available to target financial bubbles. Clever financial 
solutions probably prevented the required real adjustments. 
 
However, during systemic failures, Central Banks have to become lenders of the last 
resort, and in current conditions, even market makers of the last resort (Buiter and 
Sibert, 2007). For example, as the sub-prime crises intensified, the Federal Reserve 
created a new Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) to allow troubled financial 
institutions such as big investment houses and banks to borrow up to $200 billion in 
safe Treasury securities with their more risky investments as collateral. It was the first 
time the Fed was accepting mortgage-backed securities and lending to investment 
houses. This even though it recognized that lenders used unfair or deceptive practices 
to push high-cost loans on sub-prime borrowers. 
 
Globalization increased the power of finance compared to that of labour because of 
capital’s much greater mobility as controls on capital accounts were removed. It is 
difficult to tax an entity—such as finance capital—that can exit to regions with lower   17
tax. The huge bailouts are carrying this one step further and forcing labour to 
subsidize finance. Tax paid in good times would function as an insurance premium 
against the risk that taxpayers might have to finance bailouts in bad times. Incentives 
for pro-cyclical risk taking that prevail currently would reduce, improving financial 
stability. Contra-cyclical capital charges  should rise as the market price of risk, 
measured by financial market prices, falls in boom times (Goodhart and Persaud, 
2008). Speculative activity contributed to steeply raising prices of basic food 
consumed by the poor. Tax or regulatory initiatives would reduce imposts on the poor 
as well as speculative activity and the price spikes it generates. But any tax-based 
solution has to be adopted as a global norm since any one country imposing it alone 
would suffer capital flight.  
 
Miller (1986) pointed out that regulation and taxes function as the sand in the oyster 
shell that provokes the pearl of financial innovation. But the pearl in this case has 
turned out to be an atom bomb, and was provoked by regulatory capture that 
convinced regulators not to regulate. Investment banks lobbied for differential 
regulation and then could draw in talent to innovate since they were the least 
regulated. To prevent such innovative future sidestepping, any tax or regulation has to 
be global. 
 
Such a global norm has a chance of being adopted now, when the experience of the 
crisis is fresh, and meetings are being organized to debate changes in the international 
financial architecture
11. But this requires a swing towards other social groups, away 
from the extreme respect and power that financial markets commanded, and would be 
part of the movement to a middle way. For example, regulators should get relatively 
more respect and remuneration, enabling them to become more independent of 
markets. Recognition of the vulnerability of unfettered markets would make them 
more vigilant. Apart from the watering down of regulatory rules, the ideology that 
markets know best, made regulators lax in implementing even such rules as there 
were.  
 
                                                 
11 The G-20 meet in the US in November reached considerable agreement on stronger regulation of 
hedge funds, transparency, global standards, and the availability of funds for emerging markets to fight 
a crisis not of their making, but incentive features and global agreements on tax rates were not 
discussed   18
More representation and voice for emerging markets in international bodies will allow 
the “debtor view” also to be heard. It was the dominant “creditor or finance view” that 
defeated reform proposals for more transparency of hedge funds after the East Asian 
crisis (Goyal, 2002). Better balance of power and more diversity of views is essential 
to prevent one view that could be wrong and eventually harm itself, from dominating. 
Real reform of the international financial architecture will make it possible to unwind 
the reserves Asian countries have been forced to accumulate partly as a precautionary 
measure in response to leveraged and volatile capital flows. Limits on clever financial 
solutions will force necessary real reforms to remove imbalances.   
 
There is a political economy of reform and positions are taken based on interests. 
Industry lobbyists want CBs to focus on "systemic risk", to permanently provide 
liquidity to diverse markets. They want consolidation of financial regulatory agencies, 
and loosening of accounting standards. They are already trying to pass the blame on 
to regulators and intervention
12 when they had earlier successfully pushed for the 
market friendly regulation followed. They are willing to concede to more 
transparency, but want it to be limited and focused depending on audience needs (IIF, 
2008). There will be a fierce debate about the form regulatory reform will take. It is 
important to cut through to the core set of proposals that will make financial markets 
more robust and thus benefit both groups in the long run. 
  
World opinion is veering around to stricter regulation for financial markets
13. Hahn 
and Passell (2008) caution against undertaking inappropriate regulatory reform, in a 
reactive post crisis mode. They point out that in the post depression years the problem 
was wrongly taken to be low and falling prices so harmful restrictions were placed on 
competition. These created vested interests making change very difficult. Therefore 
reform should be carefully designed keeping basic principles in mind, such as include 
reducing excessive risk-taking, increasing the diversity of views in the market, 
factoring in systemic risk, improving transparency, attaching conditionality to public 
money, and universal application of basic rules to prevent regulatory arbitrage. We 
                                                 
12 Gorton (2008), for example, puts the blame for the panic of 2007 on sub-prime loans and poor 
knowledge of original risk. He largely exonerates securitization and derivatives, but while the sub 
prime crisis remained largely local, the global crisis of 2008 was propelled by the collapse of the latter. 
Sub prime was small change in comparison. 
13 See DOT (2008) and PWGFM (2008) for a summary of official views in the US, the country whose 
financial innovations have created worldwide problems.     19
argue that creating the correct incentives for market participants is the most important 
principle.  Regulators need good information flows to be alert to distortions, risky 
behaviour and fraud. Oversight must be strong enough to detect criminals, but better 
incentive structures may be sufficient to induce better behaviour from the average 
participant, and reduce information and oversight load while protecting the energy 
and innovation of markets.  
 
Price discovery in financial markets is definitely flawed by herd behaviour and over-
reaction, but futures markets are supposed to help producers plan future output and to 
hedge risks. Regulatory tightening proposed in response to speculation in 
international oil futures includes raising margin and position limits to restrict 
leverage, and making entry more difficult.  
 
As agricultural inflation rose, the GOI (2008) set up a committee to examine the 
effect of commodity futures markets, but the committee could not reach consensus. It 
found no unambiguous evidence of the effect of future trading on inflation. For some 
commodities inflation had accelerated after the introduction of futures, for others it 
had slowed down. The Chairman felt, however, that although clear causality could not 
be established, delisting of wheat futures reduced the transmission of international 
price pressures. As past committees had also pointed out, under scarce supply 
conditions, such as the fall in buffer stocks below norms, trading increases prices 
since everyone expects prices to increase. Recommendations were to improve 
regulations, information, transparency, participation by diverse groups, design 
contracts to encourage hedging over speculation, distinguish between hedgers and 
speculators with differential margins and discounts in fees or taxes for each category, 
and reduce arbitrage in response to selective regulatory tightening. 
 
Other Policy Responses 
Apart from inflation control through productivity improvements and the improved 
financial regulation discussed above, this section draws together other changes that 
could benefit the aged. These range from pension reform and other specific social 
security measures, to covering medical needs, for example, through special schemes 
for medical services through public-private partnership. Finally, there are a number of 
special measures such as better organization as a vote group, disability access and the   20
provision of other facilities that can keep the old an active, vital part of the 
community. 
     
Old Age Income Security 
Those above 60 years were only 5.5 percent of the Indian population in 2001 but the 
UN estimates this will increase to 20 percent in 2050
14. Only about a quarter of 
India’s current elderly have any social security cover. A large expansion in pension 
schemes is required to provide security for the coming explosion in numbers. 
 
The public pension system was restricted to government employees and workers in 
the organized private sector—it covered only 13 percent of the workforce.  The 
Employees’ Provident Fund and Employees’ Pension Scheme set up in 1952, for the 
organized labor force in the private sector remained heavily undersubscribed—with 
only 40 million members. 
 
In  2004, the New Pension System (NPS) shifted all new central government 
employees to a defined contribution plan. The Pension Fund and Regulatory 
Development Authority (PFRDA) Bill (2005) aims to make the NPS available to all 
workers in the unorganized private sector, and to any person governed by the 
organized sector schemes. By April 2007, already about 500,000 members had joined 
the NPS.  In 2007, the government also launched Aam Admi Bima Yojana insurance 
and health insurance (Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana) for the unorganized sector 
(Irudaya Rajan, 2008). UTI has a microfinance based pension plan, which ties up with 
microfinance NGOs to offer pensions based on small regular payments.   
 
NPS will allow personal pension accounts and entry of private pension funds. In 2009 
six fund managers are to be selected by competitive bidding, and each will be allowed 
to set up asset management companies to offer upto six pension plans. FDI will be 
capped at 26 percent. Returns are not assured but the risk averse can select a scheme 
that invests only in government securities. Choice of one of these schemes is not 
mandatory, and a subscriber has the freedom to change a scheme or fund manager 
once in a year. There will be schemes that will migrate the portfolio according to the 
                                                 
14 Irudaya Rajan (2008) gives South Asian elderly population as 100 million in 2000 with an expected 
projection to 400 million by 2050.   21
subscriber’s age, gradually shifting weight from equities to debt. There is a default 
scheme, which is yet to be decided. LIC, SBI and UTI have won the contracts to 
manage the Centre’s contributory pension scheme, and been able to give returns of 
eight percent.  
 
What are the issues involved? The agencies involved in NPS may remain those such 
as LIC, SBI that are already running the nation’s pension schemes and have the 
reputation and long- term credibility required. But the new governance structures can 
contribute to the required expansion in coverage. Worldwide, privatization of pension 
schemes has been about giving more choice and higher returns. But the recent crisis, 
that has destroyed pension assets of so many, questions the ability of private firms to 
protect assets let alone give returns. It underlines the importance of strong regulation 
and adequate capital adequacy. Regulation must impose a conservative bias, and 
correct for the psychology and incentives that can lead to excessive risk taking by 
savers and fund managers, since lifetime savings are at stake. Private pension funds 
charge high fees to cover active management inputs. But since these active inputs 
have not yielded very good results, schemes should include passive index trackers and 
fixed deposits that have low management inputs and therefore low fees. The default 
scheme should be in inflation indexed government securities. Especially if assured 
returns are done away with, inflation indexation is required. Assured returns impose a 
large fiscal cost on the Government, and impart rigidity to the interest rate structure. 
The shift to fully funded or defined contribution schemes, rather than the earlier pay-
as you-go system will build up a large corpus of long-term investible funds available 
for infrastructure financing. They will also help develop bond markets
15. They may 
not increase total Indian savings but will help shift the composition of Indian savings 
from physical to financial thus improving financial intermediation. On the whole, 
more competition, choice and wider coverage are improvements, but change must be 
slow and steady, giving time for regulators and fund managers to demonstrate their 
capability.    
 
Improvement is also required in social protection programs, to help the vulnerable to 
manage the risks and shocks to which they are subject. Preventive programs such as 
                                                 
15 At present pension funds can invest only ten percent of their corpus in the corporate debt market.   22
income support for rare and chronic diseases as well as the quality of public health 
care are the most important for the old.  It may be possible to deliver quality health 
care through innovative public private partnerships that harness private initiative. Dr. 
Shetty’s Hridalya hospitals in Bangalore are an example of the provision of quality 
healthcare at a low price through management innovations such as assembly lines for 
operations. Even so, public facilities have to be created to substitute for diminishing 
private care. Community based institutions normally offer better care. 
 
Flexibility is very important in insurance schemes—allowing free choice of hospitals 
to ensure quality and allow change of residence. Group schemes are necessary, since 
insurance companies are reluctant to give single private cover to the old 
(Bhusnurmath, 2005).  
 
Special measures 
A range of special measures is possible for senior citizens. In the information age it is 
possible for them to be better networked and informed. This can help them become a 
more effective political vote bank and fight for concessions such as tax slabs regularly 
adjusted for inflation; exemption from filing tax returns for those 75 years old or 
above; deduction of medical expenses from their income for tax purposes. NGOs are 
creating dedicated websites for seniors
16, and the RTI Act is helping them force the 
bureaucracy to implement rights they already have.  
 
There are many facilities available abroad to help seniors that are yet to be 
implemented in India. An example is handicapped access. Another is Progresa (now 
called  Oportunidades); one of the earliest conditional cash transfer (CCT) social 
assistance programs, started in Mexico in 1997 for the poor and vulnerable. Income 
transfers are used to reduce poverty in the short term, but since the transfers are 
conditional on the family’s investment in their health and education they reduce 
poverty in the long term. Since in rural India seniors have a say in the education of 
their grandchildren, making transfers to them conditional on such education will help 
improve literacy, and the status of elders in the family. 
                                                 
16Silver innings is one such site. Details available at:   
http://ngopost.org/story.php?title=Activist_proposes_separate_ministry_for_senior_citizens_launches_comp
rehensive_websiteSilver_Innings    23
 
The old also need to be protected against fraud and violence targeted specially at 
them, given their vulnerabilities. Security for old living alone has become a problem 
in many Indian cities. The US SEC has brought many enforcement cases involving 
alleged fraud against seniors, where financial firms target their retirement savings 
selling bogus investments. Seniors seeking investor education and advice at so-called 




The old are living longer, so extending the retirement age, and making multiple and 
home based careers possible through training in information and communication 
technologies, is required to help them live with dignity. Women, who often outlive 
their partners, require special help. Making it possible for elders to live more 
productive lives will make a large contribution to the nation.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
We have explored the vulnerability of the old and marginalized to the recent crises 
hitting the world economy. These are the categories that, with little help, bear the 
brunt of the follies of firms and governments. We attempt to catalogue measures to 
lower the probability of future shocks, and to reduce the impact of shocks on the 
vulnerable.  
 
Analysis of past Indian inflationary trends shows that policy has effectively subdued 
past inflation spikes, but output cost was least when food price inflation was low. 
Since the Indian polity is sharply averse to inflation spikes, the aged are protected 
from the persistent high inflation. But the complex of minimum support cum 
procurement price-subsidy policies resulting from the conflict between farmer and 
consumer interests has led to chronic low inflation. Low international food and 
commodity prices had moderated this inflation since the late nineties. International 
agricultural price shocks and persistent high agricultural inflation has underlined the 
                                                 
17 Information for US Securities and Exchange Commission: http://www.sec.gov ; and North American 
Securities Administrators Association: http://www.nasaa.org   24
importance of improving agricultural productivity to contain Indian inflation. 
Supported by appropriate fiscal and monetary policies, Indian inflation can then fall 
below even its chronic historical levels.  
 
Excessive risk taking and speculation in financial markets has aggravated global 
commodity inflation and resulted in a net transfer from the poor and vulnerable to the 
rich. Since taxpayer money is being used to bail out the financial sector, it must 
accept stronger regulation. This should be such as reduces the procyclicality of 
financial markets thus strengthening them. Taxes or prudential regulation that rise in 
boom times are equivalent to insurance premiums that would finance payouts in a 
slump, reducing incentives for excessive risk-taking. But such taxes have to be 
accepted as a global norm. A lone country applying this would be subject to capital 
flight. The revealed excesses of financial markets should make such a norm 
acceptable. It would help reverse the imbalance between taxes on labour and on 
capital created in modern times by greater capital mobility. 
 
A number of special schemes are also required for the aged, to create more 
opportunities for their active participation in society, and to protect them from the 
specific risks. While improving coverage, competition and choice through some 
private entry in pension funds is desirable, strong regulation is a precondition to 
protect from excessive risk-taking and aggressive selling by private providers. Low 
risk inflation indexed savings options must also be made available. 
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